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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
I. BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Self-Defense
In State v. Bolton' the defendant appealed a conviction of
manslaughter to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Relying on
the United States Supreme Court decision in Mullaney v.
Wilbur,' he argued that he was deprived of due process of law
since he had been required to bear the burden of proving self-
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The South Carolina
Supreme Court, however, found Mullaney inapplicable and af-
firmed the conviction, holding that to require a defendant to
prove self-defense does not deny due process.'
In Mullaney, a Maine case, the defendant had been accused
of homicide. The lower court instructed the jury that once the
prosecution proved the common elements of murder and man-
slaughter - unlawful killing and intent - a conclusive implica-
tion arose that the killing was done with malice aforethought, the
element which made the crime murder. The burden was then
upon the defendant to show by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence that he acted in the heat of passion upon sudden provoca-
tion to reduce the charge to manslaughter.' The United States
Supreme Court found this procedure improper, holding that "the
Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden
provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide
case. )"
This requirement that the prosecution prove every element
of the crime had been examined by the Supreme Court earlier in
In re Winship. 6 The Court there explained that the requirement
1. 266 S.C. 444, 223 S.E.2d 863 (1976).
2. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The Mullaney decision, however, in no way affected the
requirement that the defendant put his defense in issue:
Many States do require the defendant to show that there is "some evidence"
indicating that he acted in the heat of passion before requiring the prosecution
to negate this element by proving the absence of passion beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that requirement.
Id. at 701-02 n.28.
3. 266 S.C. at 449, 223 S.E.2d at 865-66.
4. 421 U.S. at 685-87.
5. Id. at 704.
6. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court narrowly phrased the Winship question as
1
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was based not on construction of state law but on constitutional
mandates: "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."7 Although the Mullaney decision dealt only with heat
of passion, a statutory element of the crime under Maine's stat-
ute, the defense in Bolton argued that Mullaney when read with
Winship was equally applicable to the plea of self-defense, an
affirmative defense in South Carolina.
At common law, the defendant had to prove all affirmative
defenses or "circumstances of justification, excuse, or allevia-
tion."8 Today, however, the Model Penal Code9 states that justifi-
cation for any behavior is considered an affirmative defense
which the prosecution must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt
after the defendant has given some evidence in support of his
defense. Only in "some exceptional situations"'" would the
drafters place the burden on the defendant. The Code is in line
with the majority of states in requiring the defendant to raise
the issue of self-defense, but then shifting the burden to the
prosecution to negate this defense beyond a reasonable doubt."
The minority of states,' 2 however, including South Carolina,
treat affirmative defenses as an exception to the rule that the
prosecution prove every element of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt,' 3 and South Carolina has traditionally required the
defendant to prove self-defense, an affirmative defense, by a
greater weight of the evidence.
"whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due process and fair
treatment' required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act
which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult." Id. at 359.
7. Id. at 364.
8. 421 U.S. at 693 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
10. Id. These situations would be ones where no defense exists under law at the time,
but the Code is trying to introduce a mitigation, which the prosecution might have diffi-
culty in overcoming because of problems in obtaining evidence.
11. Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2327-28 (1977).
12. Some courts have been reluctant to apply Winship and Mullaney to the affirma-
tive defenses because of the Supreme Court decision in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
(1952), where the Court upheld a state statute requiring the defendant to prove insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Leland was decided before Winship, Justice
Rehnquist and the Chief Justice, concurring in Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 705-06, reaffirmed
the validity of the Leland decision.
13. South Carolina distinguishes between a statutory element and an affirmative
defense. State v. Richburg, 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968); State v. Judge, 208 S.C.
497, 38 S.E.2d 715 (1946); State v. Osborne, 202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d 561 (1943).
19771
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The essential problem with Bolton was in the classification
of self-defense: was it properly considered to be a statutory ele-
ment of the crime, or as it has been more commonly held, an
affirmative defense, and, if it were an affirmative defense, was it
valid to distinguish between the crime and the defense by requir-
ing the state to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt, but making the defendant prove the defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Although Mullaney dealt with a statutory element of the
crime, one state court has held that Mullaney is applicable to
affirmative defenses as well. 4 The court explained that Mullaney
should apply to the "most blatant and visible [constitutional
heresy] . . . where the jury is instructed that a defendant must
prove mitigation (or justification or excuse or whatever) by a
preponderance of the evidence. ' '' 5
The Supreme Court, however, in a very recent decision,
Patterson v. New York, '6 affirmed a conviction under a New York
statute which required the defendant in a prosecution for second
degree murder to prove by a preponderance of the evidence ex-
treme emotional disturbance, an affirmative defense which would
reduce the crime to manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed
the continued validity of a distinction between affirmative defen-
ses and elements of the crime as defined by each state and upheld
the requirement that the state must prove only those facts de-
fined by statute as elements of the crime. The Court, recognizing
that at common law and at the time of adoption of both the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, the burden of proof for affirmative
defenses rested on the defendant,' 7 held that states may choose
to recognize by statute mitigating factors. "The Due Process
Clause . . does not put New York to the choice of abandoning
those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order
to convict . . . . To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance
does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case
14. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362
A.2d 629 (1976).
15. Id. at 715, 349 A.2d at 346. A recent law review article also indicates that the
Winship-Mullaney decisions warrant a change in analysis from "an improper focus on the
traditional separation of elements from excuses and justifications." Note, Affirmative
Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a
Criminal Defendant, 64 GEo. L.J. 871, 879 (1976).
16. 97 S.Ct. 2319 (1977).
17. Id. at 2323.
[Vol. 29
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in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be
too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate."' 8 The Court
held:
We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous
cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecu-
tion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant
is charged. Proof of the non-existence of all affirmative defenses
has never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no
reason to fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the
statutory defense at issue here.'9
However, in Patterson, the Court found that the state had
proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonble doubt of all the
statutory elements of murder: intent to cause the death of an-
other and causing the death of such person."0 The statute pro-
vided for no element of malice aforethought, and the mitigating
circumstance involved, extreme emotional disturbance, bore no
direct relation to any element of the crime. This was the distinc-
tion between Mullaney and Patterson. Since Maine's statute pro-
vided for malice aforethought as an element of the crime, it was
therefore held unconstitutional to allow a presumption of malice
to force the defendant to prove the opposite of malice, heat of
passion, by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Court in Patterson emphasized that the Mullaney hold-
ing did not mean that the prosecution had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact affecting the degree of criminal culp-
ability, only that it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
statutory element.2' Therefore, in light of this decision, in order
for the Supreme Court to require that the prosecution prove self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, self-defense would have to be
classified as an element of the crime. The defense in Bolton
argued this classification of self-defense.
The South Carolina Code defines murder as "the killing of
any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied,
'22
and manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of another without
18. Id. at 2326.
19. Id. at 2327.
20. Id. at 2325.
21. Id. at 2330.
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malice, express or implied."2" The defense in Bolton argued that
self-defense went to the lawfulness of the killing, and that for the
defendant to be convicted even of manslaughter, the killing had
to be unlawful. Because it is excusable to kill in self-defense in
South Carolina," the defense claimed self-defense would operate
to relieve the defendant of punishable guilt.
A similar argument had been used in Mullaney. The statute
under which the defendant there was convicted provided:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall
be punished by imprisonment for life,"" and the trial court in
Mullaney recognized that the state had to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the homicide was intentional and that it was
unlawful. "Unlawful" was defined as neither justifiable nor ex-
cusable, with examples of "unlawful" given as "a soldier in bat-
tle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and an individual act-
ing in self-defense."2 Although Maine had adopted the majority
rule requiring the state to prove self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt prior to Mullaney,"7 which could of itself explain this bur-
den on the prosecution, nevertheless, Maine's definition of unlaw-
ful indicates that self-defense is crucially related to unlawfulness,
which is a required element of manslaughter. If it violates due
process to require a defendant to prove heat of passion to reduce
his conviction from murder to manslaughter, it would follow that
it is equally unreasonable to require a defendant to prove self-
defense to maintain his presumed innocence from any guilt.
North Carolina recognized this principle in State v.
Hankerson8 when its supreme court stated that the jury instruc-
tions had unconstitutionally relieved the prosecution of proving
malice and unlawfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. The defen-
dant in Hankerson was convicted of second degree murder, after
pleading self-defense. The trial judge had charged the jury that
the state had to prove that the defendant intentionally and with-
out justification or excuse and with malice shot the deceased, but
that once the state had proved the intentional killing with a
23. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-50 (1976). State v. Norris, 253 S.C. 31, 168 S.E.2d 564
(1969).
24. State v. Martin, 216 S.C. 129, 134, 57 S.E.2d 55, 57 (1949).
25. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964).
26. 421 U.S. at 685 and n.1.
27. State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504 (Me. 1971).
28. 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2339 (1977).
[Vol. 29
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deadly weapon, two presumptions arose: that the killing was un-
lawful and that it was done with malice. To excuse his act, the
defendant had to prove, to the jury's satisfaction, that he acted
in self-defense.29 The North Carolina Supreme Court found that
unlawfulness was an essential element of the crime and that the
burden was on the state to prove unlawfulness, which in this case
was the absence of self-defense."'
Therefore, although the Patterson decision narrows
Mullaney by allowing the state to place the burden of proof on
the defendant for affirmative defenses, Patterson does not de-
crease the state's burden as to any statutory element of the crime.
Furthermore, self-defense, traditionally classified as an affirma-
tive defense, has been held by North Carolina in Hankerson to
go to the unlawfulness requirement under its statute as an ele-
ment of murder. Since South Carolina's statute also provides that
murder be done with malice aforethought and that manslaughter
be an unlawful killing, unlawfulness could be interpreted, as
North Carolina has done, to be an essential element of the crime.
B. Retroactivity
In Hankerson, the North Carolina Supreme Court also held
that, although it was error under Mullaney to place the burden
of proof on the defendant as had been done, the conviction would
stand because Mullaney could not be applied retroactively. The
court reasoned that a retroactive application could lead to the
possible catastrophe of releasing many convicted murderers upon
society.'
The Supreme Court reversed, however, and held that
Mullaney was to be given full retroactive effect. The Court held
that Ivan V. v. City of New York, 32 where the court had held that
In re Winship retroactively applied to state juvenile proceedings,
controlled. The Court stated:
"Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to
overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially im-
pairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions
about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule
29. Id. at 647, 220 S.E.2d at 586.
30. Id. at 651, 220 S.E.2d at 589.
31. Id. at 656-57, 220 S.E.2d at 592.
32. 407 U.S. 203 (1972).
1977]
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has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith
reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional
law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administra-
tion of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in
these circumstances."33
IX. THE DEATH PENALTY
In State v. Rumsey" the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the South Carolina death penalty statute was unconstitu-
tional in light of the July 2, 1976, United States Supreme Court
decisions in Gregg v. Georgia,35 Proffitt v. Florida,3 Jurek v.
Texas,3 1 Woodson v. North Carolina,35 and Roberts v. Louisiana. 9
The defendant Rumsey was convicted of murder during an armed
robbery and under section 16-52 of the South Carolina Code" was
sentenced to death. He appealed on several grounds, but after
these Supreme Court decisions, abandoned all allegations of error
except the constitutionality of the death penalty under section
16-52. The supreme court reversed in part, remanding to the
lower court for resentencing to life imprisonment.
The South Carolina Supreme Court based its decision pri-
marily on the North Carolina case Woodson v. North Carolina4'
because of the similarity of the North Carolina statute to that of
South Carolina." North Carolina's statute had provided that for
first-degree murder, imposition of the death penalty was manda-
tory. 3 The North Carolina Legislature had enacted this statute
33. Id. at 204 (1972) (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971)).
34. 267 S.C. 236, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976).
35. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
36. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
37. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
38. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
39. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1976) is the current citation.
41. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
42. 267 S.C. 236, 238, 226 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1976).
43. The North Carolina statute provided:
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. - A murder
which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate
any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed
to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death. All other kinds
of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished
by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor more than life impris-
onment in the State's prison.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
[Vol. 29
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in response to the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Furman v.
Georgia,44 where the Court held that imposition of the death pen-
alty under the circumstances of the case presented constituted
cruel and unusual punishment, violating the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. The circumstances were state statutes al-
lowing broad discretion in the judge or jury to impose or withhold
the death penalty.
Since the Supreme Court in Furman did not rule on the
question of whether a mandatory death penalty would be consti-
tutional, 5 the North Carolina General Assembly thought that
removal of any discretion from the jury in first-degree murder
cases would bring their statute in line with the decision in
Furman.4" However, the Supreme Court in Woodson47 explained
that this was not a constitutionally acceptable alternative for
several reasons: some jurors throughout the years had been reluc-
tant to convict a defendant where the death sentence would be
an automatic consequence;" society itself has not been in favor
of automatic death sentences;4" and the jury would be precluded
from considering any relevant circumstances of the individual
case before sentencing.
The South Carolina statutory changes after Furman were
similar. The 1962 Code had provided:
Punishment for murder. - Whoever is guilty of murder shall
suffer the punishment of death; provided, however, that in any
case in which the prisoner is found guilty of murder the jury may
find a special verdict recommending him to the mercy of the
court, whereupon the punishment shall be reduced to imprison-
ment in the Penitentiary with hard labor during the whole life-
time of the prisoner.'
Then like North Carolina and many other states,52 in response to
44. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
45. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
46. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 300 (1976) (referring to the state's brief
in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973)). This brief indicated that the
legislature sought to remove "all sentencing discretion [so that] there would be no suc-
cessful Furman based attack upon the North Carolina statute."
47. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
48. Id. at 293, 302-03.
49. Id. at 297.
50. Id. at 303-04.
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (1962).
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the Furman decision, South Carolina enacted a new statute
which removed from the jury any discretion in imposition of the
death penalty. It was mandatory under certain defined circum-
stances and allowed no jury consideration of mitigating condi-
tions.
Whoever is guilty of murder under the following circum-
stances shall suffer the penalty of death:
(1) Murder committed while in the commission of the fol-
lowing crimes or acts: (a) rape; (b) assault with intent to ravish;
(c) kidnapping; (d) burglary; (e) robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon; (f) larceny with use of a deadly weapon; (g)
housebreaking; (h) killing by poison; (i) lying in wait.
(2) Murder committed for hire based on some considera-
tion of value.
(3) Murder of a law-enforcement officer or correctional
officer while acting in the line of duty.
(4) The person convicted of committing the murder had
previously been convicted of murder, or was convicted of com-
mitting more than one murder.
(5) Murder that is willful, deliberate and premeditated. 3
The South Carolina Supreme Court believed that the legisla-
ture's effort to comply with Furman was successful, since it inter-
preted Furman as condemning legislation which vested the jury
with discretion in imposing the death penalty. Because section
16-52 allowed no such discretion, but rather provided specific
circumstances in which the death penalty might be imposed, it
was in compliance with that decision. 4 However, according to the
more recent Supreme Court decisions in Woodson and the other
cases, this statute was unconstitutional, and the South Carolina
court in Rumsey"5 held it so.
The line between the jury discretion condemned in Furman
and the inability of the jury to consider mitigating circumstances
condemned in Woodson is narrow. The two cases together indi-
cate that although the death penalty constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment if it can be imposed by the trier without
guidelines, it is constitutional if the type of offenses upon which
it may be imposed is limited and defined, and if the trier can
consider relevant facts which have been statutorily defined.
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1976).
54. State v. Allen, 266 S.C. 175, 185, 222 S.E.2d 287, 291 (1976).
55. 267 S.C. 236, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976).
[Vol. 29
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This refinement was based upon the eighth amendment re-
quirement that the state's power to punish be "exercised within
the limits of civilized standards."" These civilized standards
throughout United States history have indicated both repudia-
tion for an automatic death sentence and approval for jury discre-
tion. "[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can per-
form" is to choose between life imprisonment and capital punish-
ment because they are the "link between contemporary com-
munity values and the penal system."57 Although these standards
had simply been reflective of society's policy, the Supreme Court
in Woodson held that the eighth amendment, with its roots in
fundamental respect for humanity, demanded that in order to
inflict the death penalty in capital cases, the jury must consider
the character and record of the defendant and the particular cir-
cumstances of the crime. 8
To avoid uncontrolled discretion, however, the standard
under which the jury is to perform must be enunciated. Furman
requires "objective standards to guide, regularize, and make ra-
tionally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of
death." 9 This requirement is not satisfied by narrowing the scope
of offenses for which the death penalty must be applied" because
this still would not allow jury consideration of the circumstances
nor would it establish any standards for this decision. What is
acceptable is a statute like that of Georgia which provides for a
bifurcated trial,6" where in the first stage, the defendant's guilt or
innocence is determined, and if he is found guilty, then in the
second stage, a presentence hearing is held to hear any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances. Georgia's statute additionally
specifies ten aggravating circumstances, the existence of any one
of which must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
before the death penalty may be imposed. 2 The judge is bound
by the jury's recommendation, and there is an automatic appeal
to the Georgia Supreme Court. That court must look for any
56. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 288 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1948) (plurality opinion)).
57. Id. at 295 (quoting Justice Stewart for the majority in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519 and n.15 (1968)).
58. Id. at 304.
59. Id. at 303.
60. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333.
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534 (1972).
62. Id. at § 27-2534.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
19771
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss1/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
arbitrary factor which might have influenced the sentence and
consider whether the death penalty was in proportion to the pen-
alty in similar cases, which must be cited if the death penalty is
affirmed.63
On June 7, 1977, the South Carolina Legislature passed a
new death penalty bill." It provides for a separate sentencing
procedure before the jury after a verdict of guilty, with additional
evidence being heard in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation
of the punishment. The statute lists both aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances and requires that the jury indicate which
aggravating circumstance it found in order to recommend the
death penalty. The court must sentence the defendant to death
when the jury finds one of the aggravating circumstances and
recommends death. There is an automatic appeal to the supreme
court which must look for arbitrary factors, including whether the
evidence supports a finding of an aggravating circumstance and
whether the death sentence is excessive in relation to the penalty
imposed in similar cases.
IlI. COMMENT ON ASSERTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In State v. Middleton65 the defendant was convicted of the
rape of a sixteen year old female and armed robbery by the
Charleston County Court of General Sessions. Within an hour
after the incident, the police arrived on Middleton's street where
he was standing with friends and asked him to accompany them
to the station;66 without being either arrested or charged, he was
given Miranda warnings" and asked to consent to a combing of
his pubic area. Middleton agreed initially; however, after being
told that he did not have to consent, 9 he withdrew permission,
asking to be charged or released, and was released."
63. Id. at § 27-2537.
64. No. 177, [1977] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. -.
65. 266 S.C. 251, 222 S.E.2d 763 (1976), cert. granted, judgment vacated and
remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), aff'd on rehearing, No. 20360 (S.C., filed Feb. 9, 1977),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. March 4, 1977) (No. 76-6334).
66. Record, vol. 1, at 153.
67. Id. at 154; id., vol. 2, at 197.
68. Id., vol. 2, at 328, 333.
69. Id. at 202.
70. The record does not indicate that there was probable cause for arrest or for a
search at the police station. If there had been probable cause, the transitory nature of the
evidence sought, since it could have been destroyed by showering, would have supplied
the exigent circumstances necessary for a search without warrant. The police also indi-
[Vol. 29
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At trial the defendant's refusal to consent to the combing was
introduced into evidence over objections by his counsel, and this
constituted one allegation of error on appeal. The South Carolina
Supreme Court, however, affirmed the conviction, but the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, remanding for consider-
ation in light of its recent decision of Doyle v. Ohio.
71
Doyle was a 1976 case based on the fifth amendment in which
the prosecution attempted to use the defendant's silence after
Miranda warnings to impeach his testimony and an exculpatory
story he told later at trial. The prosecution's argument was that
if he really did have an explanation, the normal course of action
would have been to tell the police immediately after the Miranda
warning rather than to remain silent. The Supreme Court held
that it was fundamentally unfair and violated due process to
allow the state to offer this silence as evidence: even though
Miranda had no express assurances that the defendant's silence
would not be used against him, this protection was implicit in the
Miranda holding. In addition, the Court reaffirmed a statement
made in a previous case on the ambiguity of silence after Miranda
warnings.
[Wlhile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express
assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such cir-
cumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation
of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.2
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, found that Doyle
was factually distinguishable and held it inapposite, reaffirming
the defendant's conviction. According to the supreme court,
Doyle was based on Miranda, a case not applicable to the facts
of Middleton since there was no custodial interrogation of Mid-
dleton, and therefore the rights which Miranda was designed to
protect had not yet vested in the defendant.73
cated by their actions that they recognized the defendant's right to refuse, since the two
officers warned him that he did not have to comply, and there was no pressure put on
him to consent. Id. A magistrate would not issue a search warrant for Middleton's home
where he lived with his parents until two days later, id. at 233-34, and Middleton in fact
was not arrested for this crime until 12 days later. Id. at 341.
71. 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976).
72. Id. at 2245.
73. No. 20360 (S.C., filed Feb. 9, 1977).
1977]
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The difficulty in Middleton was in classifying the defen-
dant's rights as arising under either the fourth or the fifth amend-
ment.
There are two possible interpretations of the Supreme
Court's remand in light of Doyle. One is that Middleton's refusal
was an implied testimonial inference which was compelled in
violation of the fifth amendment. This has been recognized in a
few cases74 and noted by one commentator as the correct interpre-
tation in similar cases. 5 The introduction of this refusal is proba-
tive of the "'probable state of belief to be inferred from his con-
duct' - an implied admission of guilt by conduct or silence."76
The other interpretation is that Doyle stands for the broader
teaching that comment on the rightful exercise of a constitutional
privilege is, impermissible as a violation of the Constitution,
whether the privilege arises under the fourth or fifth amend-
ment.77
The view which appears to be most consistent with the
United States Supreme Court decisions is the latter: that
Middleton was a fourth amendment case, but that Doyle was
applicable despite its fifth amendment base, for its broader
meaning, that the exercise of a constitutional right is protected
within that amendment. It is believed that it was this broader
reading that the United States Supreme Court was suggesting in
its remand of Middleton for consideration in light of Doyle. Doyle
was to be used by analogy, in the absence of a case stating specifi-
cally that it is unconstitutional to penalize an individual for as-
serting his fourth amendment rights.
In both fourth and fifth amendment cases, there are two
types of evidence which a defendant may give: testimonial and
physical. Testimonial, or as it is sometimes called, communica-
tive evidence is excluded under the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination if the evidence was obtained involun-
tarily.78 "[T]he privilege [against self-incrimination] protects
74. E.g., United States v. White, 355 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1052.
75. Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Extorting
Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 So. CAL. L. REV. 597, 629 (1970).
76. Id. at 628 (citing C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 247(6) at 528 (1954)).
77. Judge Traynor in People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1966), suggests another method of analyzing the problem: as a right of privacy issue under
the fifth amendment.
78. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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an accused. . . from being compelled to testify against himself,
or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature."7
With physical evidence, as well, the defendant may exercise
his right to refuse, and the evidence may be taken by force over
his refusal only in situations involving probable cause. The
Rochin line of cases indicates what degree of force is acceptable
and what violates the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. 0 Rochin excluded from evidence two morphine capsules
which the state had obtained through induced vomiting. Later
cases, however, limited Rochin to cases involving brutality to an
individual" and allowed blood samples to be taken from an un-
conscious person" and forcible blood samples to be taken from an
unwilling defendant in Schmerber v. California.3 Schmerber,
however, enunciated several safeguards which must be present to
avoid offending the Rochin "sense of justice"" and the fourth
amendment protections: there must be probable cause for arrest
suggesting the relevance and likelihood of success of the test;
there must be exigent circumstances which would justify proceed-
ing without a warrant because of the imminent possibility of
destruction of the evidence; and the test must be one that is both
reasonable in nature and reasonably performed. 5
Within the category of physical evidence, however, there are
certain identification procedures which are generally allowed,
sometimes even without full probable cause for arrest. These in-
clude participation in line-ups,88 voice identification,87 finger-
79. Id. at 761.
80. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
81. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
82. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
83. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
84. 342 U.S. at 173.
85. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 768-72. In Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973), the defendant went voluntarily to the police station for questioning in the strangu-
lation case of his wife. When the police saw blood on his finger, this created enough
probable cause to take warrantless scrapings. In addition, in United States v. Smith, 470
F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court allowed evidence of a benzidine test performed on
defendant without a warrant for his arrest. The court in United States v. Allen, 337 F.
Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972), however, held that for a defendant not in custody a search
warrant was needed to take X-rays, blood, and hair samples.
86. Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
87. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966); United
States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1972).
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printing,88 and handwriting samples.89
A defendant who refuses to participate in an identification
test can be subject to comment on this refusal at trial. The court
in People v. Ellis" explained this in the context of voice identifi-
cation by contrasting speaking for identification purposes with
speaking for testimonial purposes; a defendant's refusal to speak
was considered non-testimonial and was, therefore, admissible as
circumstantial evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The court,
however, continued with the qualification that comments were
allowed only on those identification procedures which involved no
intrusion into privacy and held no disclosure of private informa-
tion." These procedures, although involving physical characteris-
tics, are distinguished from giving blood samples or taking
breathalyzer tests, where, without the defendant's consent, prob-
able cause is still necessary. For example, the Supreme Court in
Davis v. Mississippi2 has indicated that detention for the purpose
of obtaining fingerprints under narrowly defined circumstances
may be upheld without probable cause. These circumstances in-
clude prior approval by a judicial officer.1
3
There was no judicial order in Middleton, but even more
important, the purpose of the requested search was not to obtain
a sample of the defendant's hair as an identification procedure,
but rather was to search his body for alien hairs, particularly
those of the victim.9 Therefore without considering the intimate
nature of the requested search as contrasted with the less serious
intrusions dealt with in Davis, the search clearly was not to have
been conducted for identification purposes. Moreover, not only
would the search itself have been prohibited under Davis, but
also any comments on Middleton's refusal could have been dis-
qualified under the Ellis rule, since this procedure involved a high
degree of intrusion into privacy.
88. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
89. United States v. Bailey, 327 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1971). The court here stated
that the fourth amendment was designed not only to redress, but also to prevent prohib-
ited intrusions. Id. at 805.
90. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
91. Id. at 535, 421 P.2d at 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
92. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
93. Proposed FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.1 and the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 170.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) indicate that this order may issue on
reasonable grounds or reasonable cause.
94. Record, vol. 2, at 203 and Brief of Appellant at 14.
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If the proper classification of the evidence sought in
Middleton is physical evidence sought for probative value rather
than for identification purposes, as seems indicated by the record,
there is more difficulty in determining the permissibility of com-
ments at trial, since courts have gone both ways in allowing these
comments into evidence. It has been noted that if the results of
the search would have been admissible, then no violation of con-
stitutional privilege would occur in commenting on the refusal."
One commentator98 has suggested a distinction between situa-
tions in which the defendant had a constitutional or statutory
right of submitting to the test and those in which he did not,
citing Judge Traynor's decision in People v. Sudduth.7
The disparate results found in other jurisdictions may be as-
cribed to the presence or absence of an underlying constitutional
or statutory right to refuse to produce the physical evidence
sought. States that recognize a right to refuse to take such tests
exclude evidence of a refusal. States that recognize no right to
refuse allow testimony and comment on the refusal."
Under either view, the comments in Middleton should not have
been allowed into evidence. The results of the search would have
been excluded since there was neither probable cause nor exigent
circumstances, and the police warnings, both the right to remain
silent and the right not to have to consent to the search, indicated
Middleton's privilege to refuse. Therefore, physical evidence
could have been taken only from a willing defendant.
The prosecution in Middleton, however, argued a very nar-
row fourth amendment reading: that there could be no violation
since no search of the defendant ever occurred. The state added
that the only remedy for a fourth amendment violation was the
exclusion of the wrongfully taken evidence, and that since no
actual search and seizure had taken place, the fourth amendment
supplied no remedy.9 The South Carolina Supreme Court
agreed. '
The state and the South Carolina Supreme Court believed
95. C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE at 266 n.58 (1972).
96. 24 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 50 (1969).
97. 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966).
98. Id. at 547, 421 P.2d at 403-04, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96. For a list of states, see
Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 370 (1963).
99. Brief of Respondent at 12.
100. No. 20360 (S.C., filed Feb. 9, 1977).
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that the case should be considered on fifth amendment grounds:
since the refusal was verbal, it would be protected, if at all, by
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.'", This
view was based on two South Carolina cases, State v. Green' 2 and
State v. Smith.' 3 Green held that introduction of the results of a
compulsory physical examination, as non-testimonial evidence,
was not violative of the fifth amendment, where the examination
was not aided by the defendant's positive action or enforced testi-
mony. 104 Smith allowed a comment at trial on the defendant's
refusal to take a test for drunken driving. The defense in Mid-
dleton, although first arguing that these cases were not appli-
cable because they applied only when the defendant asserted
fifth amendment rights which Middleton had not yet done, then
countered the argument, stating that these cases were overruled
or at least modified by the more recent Supreme Court decision
in Schmerber.1,5
In a footnote,'" Schmerber discussed a breathalyzer test
which the defendant had refused to take and the evidence of
which refusal had been admitted into evidence without objection.
The Court indicated that general fifth amendment principles
would govern and cited Miranda, although holding that the de-
fendant was foreclosed to object because of his earlier failure to
do so. The Miranda citation was to a footnote where the Miranda
Court had stated: "In accord with our decision today, it is imper-
missible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation.
The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he
stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation."' 7
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has labeled this
Schmerber reference dictum and has stated that it contained
nothing to cause a reversal of Smith, " nevertheless the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio seems to
give new weight to this statement.
Doyle and an earlier case, United States v. Hale,'" dealt with
101. Brief of Respondent at 13-15.
102. 227 S.C. 1, 86 S.E.2d 598 (1955).
103. 230 S.C. 164, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956).
104. 227 S.C. at 6, 86 S.E.2d at 600.
105. Brief of Appellant at 15.
106. 384 U.S. 757, 765-66 n.9 (1966).
107. 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
108. State v. Miller, 257 S.C. 213, 185 S.E.2d 359 (1971).
109. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
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the ambiguity of silence. Hale distinguished between the allowa-
ble use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach and the un-
constitutional use of prior silence. The Court stated that "[i]n
most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little
probative force""' and held that the defendant's silence was not
inconsistent with his exculpatory testimony later at trial Middle-
ton's refusal to consent was not inconsistent with his assertions
of innocence and was ambiguous enough not to be used as proba-
tive of his guilt because there could have been several rational
explanations for his refusal to allow the search.
In addition to penalizing the assertion of a fourth amend-
ment right, the prosecutor's comment in Middleton also deprived
the defendant of due process by calling attention to his refusal.
United States v. Hale indicated that to call attention to a defen-
dant's silence after Miranda warnings and to insist that a jury
draw an unfavorable inference about later testimony at trial
based on this silence deprived the defendant of fundamental fair-
ness. In order to introduce this testimony at all, the state had the
burden of establishing a threshold inconsistency between a defen-
dant's refusal to consent and his later plea of not guilty."' What-
ever probative force this refusal might have, the court in Hale
indicated that this value would be far outweighed by its prejudi-
cial nature, since it is likely that the jury assigned far more weight
to the refusal than was warranted."'
Similarly, in Johnson v. United States,"' once the court had
granted the defendant the privilege not to testify to a question,
even though the court might have demanded an answer had it
chosen to, it was error for the court then to comment on the
defendant's silence. Although the dissent in Doyle felt that this
due process argument sounded like estoppel,"' nevertheless the
holding was that if the defendant were advised that he might
remain silent and did so, it was presumed to be in reliance on the
warning and, therefore, under certain circumstances unfair to use
this silence against him.
Although obviously dealing with the protection of a fifth
amendment right, Doyle and its rationale are applicable because
110. Id. at 176.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 180.
113. 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
114. 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (Stevens, Blackmun, & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
1977]
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss1/7
98 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
its teaching is broad enough to furnish protection for the exercise
of a fourth amendment right. The fundamental concept exists
that within the protection offered by each amendment must be
included the right that exercise of any privilege within that
amendment is also protected. It is as much a violation of the
fourth amendment to penalize its exertion as it is to do an actual
search in the absence of consent or probable cause. Justice Black
recognized this when he stated in the context of the fifth amend-
ment, "I can think of no special circumstances that would justify
use of a constitutional privilege to discredit or convict a person
who asserts it. The value of constitutional privileges is largely
destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.""
5
Elizabeth W. Powers
115. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring).
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